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ABSTRACT
When first I wrote on the subject in 1974, Second Amendment scholarship was
almost nonexistent, but the common belief was that the Amendment protected some
manner of State right to control National Guard units, a belief universally accepted
in case law at the federal level.
Thirty-five years later, the picture has radically changed. District of Columbia v.
Heller,1 established the Second Amendment as an individual right, and McDonald v.
Chicago,2 held it was a fundamental right incorporated under the 14th Amendment.
There already are several appellate rulings on its scope, and approximately a dozen
more test cases on the way.
This article explores the origins of the two competing theories of the Second
Amendment – the “individual rights” approach which carried the majority in Heller
and McDonald, and the variants of a “collective right” theory which was previously
dominant in the lower courts, and one variant of which was endorsed by the Heller
dissents. Careful analysis of states’ bills of rights of the Framing period suggests that
two guarantees were desired, by different political factions. Framers closely adhering
to the Classical Republican point of view favored protection for the militia as a
system; those favoring the emerging Jeffersonian point of view favored guarantees
of individual rights to arms. The Second Amendment has two clauses because it has
two purposes.
1

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).

2

McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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This article also suggests that the prior Supreme Court ruling, United States v.
Miller,3 was almost certainly a collusive case, and that its ambiguity is a product of
very poor briefing and assignment to the exceptionally lazy Justice McReynolds,
whom the Chief Justice understandably detested.
The “collective right” theory, while dominating case law circa 1990, had little
standing throughout most of our history. It rose to prominence only in the lower
federal courts beginning in the 1940s, and achieved its dominance only in the 1970s.
Put in historical context, Heller and McDonald are not so much a dramatic change in
constitutional interpretation so much as a rejection of a relatively recent trend in the
lower courts, a trend that was subject to academic criticism even as it took form.
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.4
As late as a decade ago, the federal courts’ interpretation of the Second
Amendment was simple. Every circuit that had ruled upon it had held that it did not
guarantee an individual right to arms for individual purposes. Rather, it reflected
some form of “collective right,” either (1) a right of states to have militia systems, or
(2) a right of individuals, but only to engage in state-organized militia activities.5
Five years later this position had collapsed. In District of Columbia v. Heller,6
followed by McDonald v. City of Chicago,7 the Supreme Court accepted the
individual right for individual purposes view. More astonishing, the first form of
“collective rights,” which saw it as a right of States and had prevailed in three
circuits,8 lost 9-0!9 The circuits quickly turned to determining the parameters of the
right which they had previously thought nonexistent.10

3

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).

4
U.S. CONST. amend. II. (denoting 18th century copyists freely altered punctuation when
transcribing text thus there are versions with one, two, and three commas).
5

See, e.g., United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
807 (1997); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1997); Hickman v. Block, 81
F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom.; Hickman v. City of Los Angeles, 519 U.S. 912
(1996); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hale, 978
F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1984); Quilici v.
Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983);
United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103
(6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st
Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943).
6

Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

7

McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).

8

United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]here can be no serious
claim to any express constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm.”); United States
v. Scanio, No. 97-1574, 1998 WL 802060, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1998) (indicating the
Second Amendment was “meant solely to protect the right of the states to keep and maintain
armed militia . . . .”); Block, 81 F.3d 98, 101 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Second Amendment is a
right held by the states, and does not protect the possession of a weapon by a private
citizen.”).
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Such a change might be considered “revolutionary” in the modern usage of that
word. But when the Second Amendment is placed in historical context, it becomes
apparent that the change was revolutionary in the original use of the term – a change
which returns things to the point of their beginning.11 From the framing of the Bill
of Rights onward, the individual right view (i.e., individual right for individual
purposes such as self-defense) held sway in every venue – courts, commentators,
Congress. The collective right view did not begin to gain acceptance in the federal
courts until the 1940s, and did not become widespread until the 1970s. At the time
of Heller, it was but a few decades old, and had been subject to serious scholarly
challenge for most of that brief lifespan.
This article will examine the history of the two competing theories in terms of
the Framing period, the developments in American law prior to the Civil War, and
the understandings of courts, commentators, and Congress following that War. We
will then review developments of the Twentieth Century, including the origins of
collective right interpretation over that period.
I. THE AMERICAN RIGHT TO ARMS AS SEEN BY THE FRAMERS AND THEIR
CONTEMPORARIES
A. Background: the Anglo-American Experience
When conceptualizing the right to arms, early American thought was informed
by two well-known concepts, one of which focused upon individual ownership of
arms to implement a core right of self-defense, the other which focused upon a
universal militia as the only safe defense of a free polity.
As Joyce Malcolm has extensively documented,12 the English perception of an
individual right to arms arose out of a 17th century reversal of policy course.13 Prior
to the Stuart dynasty, English governments actively forced their subjects to own and
use arms. All healthy male subjects were required to own arms appropriate to the
period and their wealth,14 towns were required to construct shooting ranges,15 and all
9
Even the Heller dissenters argued against it: “The question presented by this case is not
whether the Second Amendment protects a ‘collective right’ or an ‘individual right.’ Surely it
protects a right that can be enforced by individuals.” 554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10

See, e.g., United States v. Chester, No. 09-4084, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 26508 (4th Cir.
Dec. 30, 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. White, 593 F.3d
1199 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009); In re United
States, 578 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Engstrom, 609 F. Supp.2d 1227 (D.
Utah 2009).
11
See THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF POLITICS 465 (Iain McLean & Alistair
McMillan eds., 2003) (“Before 1789, the word often meant, truer to its literal meaning, a
return to a previous state of affairs . . . .”).
12

JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
RIGHT (1994).
13

Id. at 1, 13-15.

14

The 1181 Assize of Arms, for instance, required all free men to possess a lance and
armor. EUGENE MORROW VIOLETTE ET AL., SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
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games other than marksmanship were outlawed in order to ensure that Englishmen
would have but one legal sport.16 The arms-bearing populace eventually came to be
known as the militia, and was organized under royal officials, the Lords Lieutenant.
Wracked by instability,17 the Stuart kings radically reversed these policies. Their
primary legal tools were the Militia Act of 1662, which authorized the Lords
Lieutenant or their deputies to disarm anyone they might “judge dangerous to the
peace of the Kingdom,” and the Game Act of 1671, which (under the justification of
preventing poaching) forbade all but the wealthiest landowners to possess firearms.18
James II in particular tried to enforce these measures. One example is a 1686 order
that informed the Lords Lieutenant that James had heard that “a great many persons
not qualified by law under pretence of shooting matches keep muskets or other guns
in their houses,” and ordered them “to cause strict search to be made for such
muskets or guns and to seize and safely keep them till further order.”19
James was overthrown in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, to be succeeded by
William and Mary.20 Parliament then drafted a Declaration of Rights,21 which the
new monarchs were required to accept before taking the throne.
The Declaration was a minimalist guarantee of rights; only the most “ancient and
indubitable” English rights were spelled out. Free speech was protected only in
Parliament; freedoms of the press, of assembly, and of religion were nowhere
mentioned. But among the core rights protected was that of arms: “the subjects
which are Protestant may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and
as allowed by law.”22
The individual nature of this right was clear, not only from its text, but from its
history. The Parliamentary debates had centered upon individual disarmaments
under the 1662 Militia Act. Sir Richard Temple referred to “Militia Bill—Power to
disarm all England—Now done in Ireland,” Mr. Boscawen lodged a personal
HISTORY 23 (George B. Adams & H. M. Stephens eds., 1926) (1901). The 1285 Statute of
Winchester extended this duty to all males aged 15-60, including serfs. Id. at 43, 78-79. In
1511, Parliament required all Englishmen aged 7-60 to have and practice with the longbow. 3
Hen. 8 c. 3, 3 STATUTES OF THE REALM 25 (1511).
15
See An Acte for Maynten’nce of Artillarie and debarringe of unlawful Games, 33 Hen.
8 c. 9, 3 STATUTES OF THE REALM 837, 838 (1541).
16

Id. See also ALEC R. MYERS, 4 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 1182 (Alec R. Myers
ed., 1969) (including a 1363 proclamation of Edward III outlawing “throwing stones, wood, or
iron, playing handball, football, or ‘stick-ball’ . . . or hockey, or cock-fighting . . . ” or any
other games of this kind, which are worthless).
17

Charles I was overthrown by the English Civil Wars of 1642-1651 and beheaded in their
aftermath, while his sons Charles II and James II were driven into exile, returning with the
Restoration of 1660. James II in turn was overthrown by the Glorious Revolution of 1688.
18

14 Car. 2, c. 2 (1662); 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 25 (1671). See generally P. B. MUNSCHE,
GENTLEMEN AND POACHERS: THE ENGLISH GAME LAWS 1671-1831 11-14 (1981).
19

2 JAMES II, CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS DOMESTIC SERIES 314 (London 1686).

20

Mary being his daughter and William his son-in-law. Dysfunctional families are not a
modern concept.
21

1 W. & M., c. 2 (1689).

22

Id.
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complaint, “Militia—Imprisoning without reason; disarming—Himself disarmed . .
.” and Sergeant (then a legal rank) added “Militia Act—An abominable thing to
disarm the nation . . . .”23 Early drafts, which would have focused upon the keeping
and providing of arms “for the common defense” were dropped in favor of an
individual right guarantee.24 Thus one modern English military historian’s complaint
that: “The original working implied that everyone had a duty to be ready to appear in
arms whenever the state was threatened. The revised wording suggested only that it
was lawful to keep a blunderbuss to repel burglars.”25
Blackstone’s Commentaries, the foremost explanation of law available to the
Framing generation, explained this in individualist terms:
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present
mention, is that of having arms for their defense, suitable to their
condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also
declared by the same statute, 1 W. and M. St. 2, c. 2 [the Declaration of
Rights], and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the
natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of
society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of
oppression.
In these several articles consist the rights, or as they are frequently
termed, the liberties of Englishmen . . . .26
It is thus not surprising that when, prior to the Revolution, the British complained
of Americans’ stockpiling of arms, Sam Adams published a response: “It is a natural
right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights,
to keep arms for their own defence; and as Mr. Blackstone observes, it is to be made
use of when the sanctions of society and law are found insufficient to restrain the
violence of oppression.”27
The other component of the legal background was the American militia systems.
From their beginning, the colonies had required all adult males (and sometimes adult
females, if heads of households)28 to possess arms. In an echo of the modern

23

2 PHILLIP YORKE, MISCELLANEOUS STATE PAPERS FROM 1501 TO 1726 416-17 (Phillip
Yorke ed., London 1778). Hardwick found the penciled notes of Lord Somers, covering the
debate in the House of Commons.
24

See MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 119.

25

Id.

26

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
Lippincott Co. 1893).

ON THE

LAWS

OF

ENGLAND 143-44 (J.B.

27

OLIVER DICKERSON, BOSTON UNDER MILITARY RULE 79 (1936) (reprinting the article as
it appeared in THE NEW YORK JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT).
28

See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, ARMED AMERICA 4, 7 (2006).
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“unorganized militia,”29 some statutes exempted critical occupations from militia
training, yet still required those persons to own arms.30
In a world faced with attacks by Native Americans and by rival French, Spanish,
and Dutch colonists, the militia concept was a practical one. It acquired intellectual
underpinnings from the writings of the English Classical Republican authors, such as
Roger Molesworth, James Harrington, and James Burgh.31 These argued that a
universal militia was the only safe and effective defense of a free people: A
professional army must either be too weak to defend a free people, or powerful
enough to take over the government and private property. A militia composed of
voters and property owners could be as powerful as desired, yet pose no risk to
government or property, since its members were the very ones who controlled both.
The Framing generation thus acted against a dual legal background, both
components of which linked individual arms ownership to freedom. One component
stressed the right to have arms, as a means of individual self-defense; the other
stressed the duty to have arms, as a means of collective self-defense. It is not
surprising that when, following the Declaration of Independence, the new States
drafted bills of rights, provisions on arms took two different courses, which only
became merged late in the period.
B. Understanding of the Framing Period
1. Framing Period Evidence for an Individual Rights Understanding
a. Evidence of Separate Origins for the Amendment’s Clauses
During the Heller oral argument, Justice Kennedy advanced a theory that the
Second Amendment’s two clauses had two independent purposes:
[I]t seems to me that there is an interpretation of the Second Amendment
differing from that of the district court and in Miller and not advanced
particularly in the red [Respondent’s] brief, but that conforms the two
clauses and in effect delinks them.
The first clause I submit can be read consistently with the purpose I've
indicated of simply reaffirming the existence and the importance of the
militia clauses.
29

See 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2006).

30
See Robert A. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Bear Arms
in Early America, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 145, 148, 166 (2007); Militia Act of 1792, §§ 12, 1 Stat. 271-72.
31
See FRANCIS HOTOMAN, FRANCO-GALLIA iv (Roger Molesworth trans., London 1711);
THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 442 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1977); 2 JAMES
BURGH, POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS: AN ENQUIREY INTO PUBLIC ERRORS, DEFECTS AND ABUSES
345, 390, 474-76 (London 1774) (reprint 1971). These authors, and especially Burgh, carried
great influence among Americans of the Framing period. See generally Robert E. Shalhope,
The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 127-29 (1986);
David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second
Amendment, 9 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 586-87 (1986).
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As you've indicated, they're in

And so in effect the amendment says we reaffirm the right to have a
militia, we've established it, but in addition, there is a right to bear arms.32
The historical record supports Justice Kennedy’s theory. The Bill of Rights
originated as a Federalist attempt to appease, or neutralize, critics of the original
Constitution, who feared that the new government would abuse its powers.33 The
Second Amendment has two clauses, because it had a dual ancestry and was
intended to appease two different concerns. The first concern rose directly from
Classical Republican thought: of all defenses for a republic, only a militia composed
of land-owning voters could be both strong and safe. The second concern’s origins
came from what would later be known as Jeffersonianism, and centered upon
guarantees of rights, including an individual right to arms.
At the outset, framers of American constitutions treated the two as a binary
choice; only very late in the process did they realize that both could be combined.
The comparative influence of Classical Republicanism and Jeffersonianism can be
illustrated by comparing a body’s militia vs. arms choice to its decisions relating to
another tenet of Classical Republicanism – that voters should be landowners – and of
Jeffersonianism – universal manhood suffrage.
Virginia, 1776. The two approaches appeared at the very outset, as Virginia
drafted the first State constitution and declaration of rights. The framers were
presented with two approaches.
Thomas Jefferson’s proposal

32

District of Columbia v. Heller – Oral Argument, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law, available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_
290/argument (emphasis added) (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). Justice Scalia then took a related
approach:
I don't see how there's any, any, any contradiction between reading the second
clause as a . . . as a personal guarantee and reading the first one as assuring the
existence of a militia, not necessarily a State-managed militia because the militia that
resisted the British was not State-managed.
But why isn't it perfectly plausible, indeed reasonable, to assume that since the
framers knew that the way militias were destroyed by tyrants in the past was not by
passing a law against militias, but by taking away the people's weapons . . . that was
the way militias were destroyed.
The two clauses go together beautifully: Since we need a militia, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.
Id.
33

See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 30-39 (1999).
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Guarantee: “No freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms.”34
Franchise: All residents.35
George Mason’s (successful) proposal
Guarantee: “That a well-regulated militia, or composed of the body of the people,
trained to arms, is the proper, natural and safe defense of a free state . . . .”36
Franchise: Landowners.37
Pennsylvania, 1776. The Virginia Declaration was quickly followed by that of
Pennsylvania, where “radical” forces had stage a political coup.38
The
Pennsylvanians borrowed heavily from the Virginia measure, but made one major
change.
Guarantee: “That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of
themselves and the state.”39
Franchise: All taxpayers.40
Maryland, 1776.
Guarantee: “That a well-regulated militia is the proper and natural defence of a
free government.”41
Franchise: Freeholders with 50 acres of land, or 30 pounds of property.42
34
1 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 344 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). Jefferson’s draft adds
“[within his own lands or tenements],” the brackets indicating that he was either considering
adding, or considering deleting, this phrase.
35

In a letter to Edmund Pendleton, dated August 26, 1776, Jefferson explained, “I was for
extending the right of suffrage (or in other words the right of a citizen) to all who had a
permanent intention of living in the country . . . . Whoever intends to live in a country must
wish that country well . . . .”
36
Virginia
Declaration
of
Rights
§
13
(1776),
available
at
http://www.constitution.org/bcp/virg_dor.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). The inclusion of the
word “safe” highlights the Classical Republican understanding that the militia was the only
defensive system that could be both effective as to enemies and safe from the standpoint of a
free State.
37

The franchise had long been limited to landowners. An act for prevention of undue
election of Burgeses, 3 Henings’ Laws of Virginia 173 (1699), and Mason’s draft left this in
place.
38
See generally Samuel B. Harding, Party Struggles Over The First Pennsylvania
Constitution, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR
1894 371 (1895).
39
5 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3082-83 (1909).
40

Id.

41

MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XXV, available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/md1776.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
42
MD. CONST. § II, available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/md-1776.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 2011).
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Vermont, 1777.
Guarantee: “That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of
themselves and the State; and, as standing armies, in the time of peace, are
dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military should be
kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.”43
Franchise: All freemen.44
Massachusetts, 1780.
Guarantee: “The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common
defence.”45
Franchise: Freehold worth three pounds, or property worth sixty, for the lower
house; freehold worth sixty pounds, for the upper.46
Kentucky, 1792.
Guarantee: “The rights of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and
the State shall not be questioned.”47
Franchise: All free males.48
Framers of the early state constitutions thus appear to have seen a binary choice
between praising the militia or guaranteeing an individual right to arms, and the
choice largely parallels their choice between the Classical Republican belief that
only property owners should vote and the Jeffersonian ideal of universal manhood
suffrage. There are two sets of concerns being expressed here, backed by two
somewhat different political philosophies.
The debates over the ratification of the proposed Constitution begat the
movement for an American bill of rights. The earliest proposals still regarded
matters as a binary choice, and uniformly went with the individual right to arms
rather than a militia clause. Thus the publicized report of the minority of the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention49 called for:
[T]he people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and
their own state, or the United States, or the purpose of killing game; and

43

VT.
DECLARATION
OF
RIGHTS
§
XV,
available
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/vt01.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
44

at

VT. CONST. § XVI, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/vt01.asp.

45

MASS.
DECLARATION
OF
RIGHTS
§
XVII,
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
46

MASS. CONST.
ch.
1,
art.
II,
ch.
3,
art.
IV,
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).

available
available

at
at

47

KY. CONST. art. XII, § 23, available at http://courts.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/7471028C8BCC-41A2-BA80-02013D4FA550/0/1stKYConstitution.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
48

Id. at art. III, § 1.

49

The merchant class had eventually returned to power.
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no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for
crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals . . . .50
The next demand came in Massachusetts, where Samuel Adams unsuccessfully
proposed a guarantee “that the said constitution be never construed to authorize
Congress . . . to prevent the people of the United States, who are peaceable citizens,
from keeping their own arms . . . .”51 When New Hampshire gave the Constitution
the ninth vote necessary for ratification, it requested the guarantee that “Congress
shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual
Rebellion.”52
Then came the Virginia ratifying convention, and the breakthrough. The
Virginians realized that the militia/right to arms choice was a false dichotomy. If
those who wanted a right to arms were also in favor of the militia system, and those
who preferred a militia guarantee also believed in a right to arms, why not
incorporate both? The Virginia ratifiers thus proposed a guarantee that was the
direct ancestor of the Second Amendment: “That the people have a right to keep and
bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people trained
to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state . . . .”53 The Virginia
formulation became instantly popular among the few remaining State conventions.
New York (which ratified) and North Carolina (which did not) accepted it with but a
minor change in wording.54
The Framers and their contemporaries understood that the future Second
Amendment had dual roots. One portion related to rights, arising from individual
self defense, the other related to duties, arising from needs for social self defense. As
there was no conflict between the two, it made sense to put both in writing.
Omitting praise for the militia might alienate constitutional critics such as George
Mason; omitting an individual right to arms would alienate others, such as the
Pennsylvania minority and New Hampshire majority. “Either/or” was resolved by
“and.”

50

2 MADISON STATE HISTORICAL SOC’Y OF WIS., THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 597-98 (Merrill Jensen ed., Wisconsin, Worzalla
Publishing Company, 1796). The minority’s proposals were met with criticism based on the
argument that the new national government would have no power over individual arms
ownership, so that its provisions would be superfluous. See Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of
the People or the Power of the State: Bearing Arms, Arming Militias, and the Second
Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 131, 150 (1991).
51

DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS 86-87 (Boston 1856). See also PAUL LEWIS, THE GRAND INCENDIARY: A
BIOGRAPHY OF SAMUEL ADAMS 361 (1973); 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 675 (Leon Friedman et al. eds.,1971).
52

2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 761. See generally, JOSEPH BURBEEN WALKER, BIRTH
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: A HISTORY OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE CONVENTION (Boston,
Supples & Sound, Publishers, 1888).

OF THE
53

2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 842.

54

Id. at 912 (“including the body of the people” rather than “composed of the body of the
people”).
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b. The Drafting of the Second Amendment
Madison’s understanding came into play when he began work on a national bill
of rights. Madison’s arms-related amendment would indeed praise the militia and
guarantee a right to arms, but he appears to have placed greater weight on the latter
provision. First, we have his handwritten outline for a speech introducing his bill of
rights, a portion of which lists the inadequacies of the English Declaration of Rights,
including its guarantee of arms rights to protestants only:
fallacy on both sides—especy as to English Decln. of Rts.—
1. mere act of parlt.
2. no freedom of press—Conscience
Gl. Warrants—Habs. corpus
jury in Civil Causes—criml.
attainders—arms to Protestts.55
A second indication lies in Madison’s original format for the bill of rights.
Today we are accustomed to a Bill of Rights which has ten numbered “stand alone”
provisions. Madison’s draft, as introduced in Congress, envisioned the amendments
being inserted in the body of the Constitution, and designated where each portion
would so be placed.56 Thus—
His first two provisions, which dealt with Congressional apportionment
and compensation (and failed of ratification) were to be placed in Article
I, sections two and six, which dealt with representation in the House and
with compensation of House members;

Provisions which would become the First through Sixth, and Ninth,
Amendments were to be placed at “Article 1st, Section 9, between
Clauses 3 and 4” – following the original Constitution’s restrictions on
enactment of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder.

An unsuccessful attempt to restrict State infringements of religious
liberty, freedom of the press, or the right to criminal jury trial was inserted
in Article I, section 10, alongside the original Constitution’s restriction of
State powers.

Provisions relating to appeals, jury trial, and indictment, were to be
inserted in Article III, which had dealt with the Judiciary.

55

12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 193-94 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979).

56

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 201 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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A provision on separation of powers, and the future Tenth Amendment,
would become a new Article VII, with the existing Article VII
renumbered as Article VIII.
Madison did not designate the future Second Amendment as a modification of
Article I, section 8’s establishment of Congressional power over the militia. Instead
he grouped it with the future first six amendments as restrictions on Congressional
legislative power contained in Article I, section 9. The Committee of Eleven, to
whom Madison’s proposals were assigned, kept his organization.57
There is strong evidence that others – in particular, members of the First
Congress – shared this understanding. The First Senate voted down two proposed
additions to the Bill of Rights. The first would have appended “for the common
defense” to the right to keep and bear arms.58 The Massachusetts Constitution of
1780 had included such a phrase in its right to arms clause, but the inclusion had
generated controversy and criticism in town meetings.59
The second would have given states additional militia powers, authorizing them
to arm and organize the militia should Congress neglect to do so.60 This likewise
failed on a voice vote.61 The First Congress thus rejected both the attempt to narrow
and by inference militia-link the right to arms, and the attempt to constitutionalize
State power over the militia.
Others of the Framing generation likewise stressed the individual right aspect of
the Second Amendment. Even while the Bill of Rights was being debated,
Madison’s friend Tench Coxe published a series of newspaper articles explaining it,
which is known to have been carried by papers in Boston, New York, and
Philadelphia.62 His explanation of the Second Amendment gave not a word to the
well-regulated militia, but assured Americans that:
As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people duly before them, may
attempt to tyrannize, and as the military forces which must be
occasionally raised to defend our country, might pervert their power to the
injury of their fellow-citizens, the people are confirmed by the next article
in their right to keep and bear their private arms.63
57

5 THE DEP’T OF STATE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 1786-1870 186-87 (1905). See also Robert E. Shalhope, The Second
Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms: An Exchange, 71 J. OF AM. HIST. 587, 589 (1984).
58
JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 77 (1820) (“On
motion to amend article the fifth, by inserting these words: ‘for the common defense’ next to
the words ‘to bear arms’: it passed in the negative.”).
59
See Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in the First State Bills of Rights:
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Vermont, and Massachusetts, VT. L. REV. 255, 302-304
(1985).
60

Id. at 75.

61

Id.

62

See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 77 n.152 (2d ed. 1994).
63

BE

ARMED: THE EVOLUTION

OF A

See id. at 76-77.
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Coxe sent a copy to Madison, who complimented him on it, noting that the article
was already in the newspapers in New York, where the First Congress was sitting.64
In short, the Second Amendment had dual points of origin, and was meant to
appeal to two different political groups. James Madison and the First Congress kept
the two concepts independent, and tended to treat the right to arms as if it were the
predominant clause.
2. Framing Period Evidence for a Militia-Uses-Only Right to Arms
While there were mentions of the militia in the ratification debates, most are
useless to our present inquiry. References to the militia’s perceived importance
merely state what is already obvious from the first clause of the Second Amendment.
Concerns that Congress might create a select, handpicked militia,65 or worries that
Congress would make militia service too burdensome so as to sabotage the system66
likewise shed no light at all on whether the right to arms was seen as limited to
militia service.
The Stevens dissent in Heller sees the Second Amendment as motivated by fears
that the new national government might “disarm the state militias” (i.e., by failing to
provide arms or mandate their purchase) thereby threatening “the sovereignty of the
several States.”67 The dissent quotes George Mason in the Virginia ratifying
convention, concerned that “Congress may neglect to provide for arming and
disciplining the militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for Congress has the
exclusive right to arm them.”68 Since the Virginia Convention ended with a call for
a bill of rights that included an obvious ancestor of the Second Amendment (“the
people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, composed of
the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a
free state . . . .”),69 the dissent suggests that this proposal, and thus the Second
Amendment, was meant to meet Mason’s desire to protect State rights to arm their
militias.
A simple timeline shows, however, that Mason’s concerns did not underlie the
Second Amendment ancestor, but rather a different proposal which was added to the
Virginia demands after he gave the above speech, and which failed to be accepted by
the First Congress. That different proposal read: “That each state respectively shall
have the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining its own militia,
whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for the same . . . .”70
64

12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 55, at 239-41, 257.

65

See, e.g., LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 21-22, 124 (Walter
Hartwell Bennett ed., 1978); 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 50, at 509; 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 55, at
378.
66

See, e.g., Patrick Henry’s argument that Congress might require one type of militia
musket, and the States another: “But can the people afford to pay for double sets of arms?” 1
JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 386 (2d ed. 1836).
67

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

68

Id. at 639.

69

Id.

70

3 ELLIOT, supra note 66, at 660.
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The Virginians were capable of clearly addressing a problem, and did so here. This
becomes even clearer when we examine a timetable:
June 11, 1788: The Virginia Ratifying Convention considers a draft of a
bill of rights, containing the ancestor of the Second Amendment: “The
people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated militia,
composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper natural
and safe defense of a free State . . . .”71 This draft said nothing about State
powers to arm militias.

June 14, 1788: George Mason realizes there is an unaddressed problem
with regard to the militia, and tells the Convention it needs a remedy.
Congress might “neglect to arm them [the militia], and prescribe proper
discipline.” He moves for a guarantee: “I wish, that in case the general
government should neglect to arm and discipline the militia, that there
should be an express declaration, that state governments might arm and
discipline them.”72

June 27, 1788: The Virginia convention ratifies the proposed constitution,
keeping the ancestor of the Second Amendment, and adding to the
proposed amendments a new provisio: “11th. That each state respectively
shall have the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining
its own militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for
the same . . . .”73
It is apparent from this sequence that the Virginians did not see their protoSecond Amendment as protecting state rights to arm militias; not one delegate
argued that the June 27 proposal was unnecessary since it was covered by the
existing “right of the people to keep and bear arms” guarantee. The militia concerns
were addressed by a separate proviso, which went nowhere. Madison did not
include it in the bill of rights he introduced in the First Congress, and when
members of the First Senate proposed to add it, the motion lost on a voice vote.74
Conclusion. In the Framing period, there is strong evidence of an intent to
recognize an individual right to arms that is independent of militia service. This is
borne out by the common law background, Madison’s reference to the English Bill
of Rights, his original placement of the Second Amendment, Tench Coxe’s
description of it, and the First Senate’s rejection of a proposal to allow States to arm
71

3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1725-1792 1054, 1068 (Robert A. Rutland, ed., 1970)
(hereinafter GEORGE MASON PAPERS).
72

See id. at 1075.

73

3 ELLIOT, supra note 66, at 660.

74

JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 58, at

75.
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their militias. There is also strong evidence of an intent to commemorate the
importance of the militia system to freedom and security. There is, however, no
evidence of any understanding that the right to arms was restricted to militia service.
II. THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE RIGHT TO ARMS IN EARLY AMERICAN LAW
Here, there are two sets of information to be considered – the writings of early
legal commentators, and early State case law.
A. Writings of Early Legal Commentators
1. Evidence from Early Commentators Supporting an Individual Right to Arms
a. St. George Tucker
St. George Tucker, professor of law at William and Mary, was a friend of
Madison, and had friends and relatives in the First Congress.75 His 1803 edition of
Blackstone’s Commentaries was the first version of that text annotated with
American decisions, and remained for two decades the legal treatise most often cited
by the Supreme Court.76 Tucker dropped a footnote to Blackstone’s description of
the British Declaration of Rights, noting “The right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed. Amendments to C., U.S., Art. 4, and this without any
qualification to their condition or degree, as is the case in the British government.”77
(The Bill of Rights as sent out for ratification had twelve amendments, with today’s
Second Amendment in fourth place.) In an appendix volume, Tucker returned to one
of his favorite themes, American legal exceptionalism:
The right of self defence is the first law of nature: in most governments it
has been the study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest
limits possible. Wherever standing armies are kept-up, and the right of
the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext
whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink
of destruction. In England, the people have been disarmed, generally,
under the specious pretext of preserving the game: a never failing lure to
bring over the landed aristocracy to support any measure . . . .78

75

Jefferson described Tucker as one of his “earliest and best friends, and acquaintances,”
while Madison appointed him to the federal bench. His brother served in the First Senate, and
his closest friend in the First House. HARDY, supra note 31, at 611-12.
76

WILLIAM HAMILTON BRYSON, LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 1779-1979 682 (1982).

77

2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION
LAWS 143 n.40 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham
Small 1803).
AND

78

1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS app. at 300 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham
Small 1803).
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Tucker’s views of the Amendment are clearly individualistic. It is linked to selfdefense, and was violated by England’s Game Acts, which had nothing at all to do
with its militia.79
b. William Rawle
William Rawle was another contemporaneous commentator – indeed, he sat in
the Pennsylvania Assembly when it ratified the Second Amendment.80 Rawle’s
1825 View of the Constitution was a popular college text in the early Republic.81
Rawle gave consideration to both clauses of the Second Amendment. With
regard to the well-regulated militia clause, Rawle discussed the dangers of standing
armies and of undisciplined militias, concluding: “The duty of the state government
is, to adopt such regulations as will tend to make good soldiers with the least
interruption of the ordinary and useful occupations of civilian life.”82
He then recognized the independent meaning of the right to keep and bear arms
clause: “The corollary, from the first position is, that the right of the people to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed. The prohibition is general. No clause in the
Constitution could by any rule of construction be conceived to give to Congress a
power to disarm the people.”83 Rawle’s understanding parallels that of the First
Congress. Yes, the militia system is important, and the first clause of the
Amendment recognizes this. But the Amendment’s second clause absolutely bars
disarmament of the people.
c. Justice Joseph Story
Justice Joseph Story is the third major commentator of the period.84 His 1833
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States85 refers to a right to arms that
supports both popular resistance and a militia system, and to his fears that without a
79

Historian Saul Cornell disputed Tucker’s commitment to an individual rights view,
contending that his earlier lecture notes had emphasized the militia aspects of the Second
Amendment. Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original
Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123 (2006). I
demonstrated, however, that Prof. Cornell was citing from Tucker’s comments on the Militia
Clauses in the unamended Constitution, and that when Tucker’s lecture notes turned to the
Second Amendment, they paralleled, often to the word, his later discussion of Blackstone.
David T. Hardy, The Lecture Notes of St. George Tucker: A Framing Era View of the Bill of
Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1527, 1533-34 (2009).
80
ELIZABETH KELLEY BAUER, COMMENTARIES
(1965).

ON THE

CONSTITUTION 1790-1860 60

81
DAVID PAUL BROWN, EULOGIUM UPON WILLIAM RAWLE 38 (Philadelphia, E. L. Carey &
A. Hart 1837).
82

WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
125 (Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin, 2d ed. 1829) (1825).
83

THE

UNITED STATES

OF

AMERICA

Id.

84

Thomas Cooley is frequently listed as a fourth, but since he wrote well after the
Framing period, he will be considered infra.
85
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES,
BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION (reprint 1991) (1833).
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militia system the people will fail to own arms, which would undermine the purposes
of the Second Amendment.
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered,
as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong
moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will
generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the
people to resist and triumph over them. And yet, though this truth would
seem so clear, and the importance of a well regulated militia would seem
so undeniable, it cannot be disguised, that among the American people
there is a growing indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a
strong disposition, from a sense of its burthens, to be rid of all regulations.
How it is practicable to keep the people duly armed without some
organization, it is difficult to see. There is certainly no small danger, that
indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus
gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of our
national bill of rights.86
While Story is the only one of the three major commentators to treat the Second
Amendment as primarily militia-centric, he stresses both arms and the militia;
indeed, his fear is that with the loss of the mandatory militia system it will be
difficult to keep the people properly armed. He gives no suggestion that a loss of the
mandatory militia system renders nugatory any right to arms. Indeed, his militiacentric approach is inconsistent with a militia-uses-only concept of the right. In that
understanding, membership in a well-regulated militia is a legal precondition to a
right to arms. Story fears that a well-regulated militia may be a practical
precondition to being armed, the lack of which will undermine the purpose of the
Second Amendment.
d. Other Commentators of the Period
There were also less influential Constitutional commentators during this period;
these have been extensively surveyed by David Kopel.87 He documents twenty-five
such 19th century commentators.88 As to the relationship between the Second
Amendment’s two clauses, their most frequent theme is that the right to arms
guarantees that the people can be skilled in arms, and thus enable formation of a
militia.89 This the opposite of any collective right conceptualization, which sees
86

Id. at 746-47.

87

David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1359.
88

Id. at 1397-1408, 1468-1503.

89

For example, Joel Tiffany explained, “The second amendment of the constitution
provides that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, because a
well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free state[,]” while John Norton
Pomeroy wrote, “a militia would be useless unless citizens were allowed to exercise
themselves in the use of warlike weapons. To preserve this privilege, and to secure to the
people the ability to oppose themselves in military force against usurpations of the
government, as well as against enemies from without, that government is forbidden by any
law or proceeding to invade or destroy the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 1469, 1477.
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militia service as a precondition of possession of a right to arms. The later
commentators also made reference to limits which could be placed on rights to arms,
such as restrictions on concealed carry, or use in brawls,90 which again is
inconsistent with a view that the right to arms was limited to militia service.
2. Evidence for a Militia-Only Right in Early Commentaries
a. Benjamin Oliver
These views were not completely unanimous; one commentator did dissent. In
1832, a Benjamin Oliver published a booklet entitled The Rights of an American
Citizen.91 Oliver spent a page discussing the virtues of the militia system. He then
suggested, without citation to authority, that
The provision of the constitution, declaring the right of the people to keep
and bear arms, &c., was probably intended to apply to the right of the
people to bear arms for such purposes only, and not to prevent congress or
the legislatures of the different states from enacting laws to prevent the
citizens from always going armed. A different construction however has
been given to it.92
Oliver’s language is tentative (“probably,” “always going armed,” “a different
construction however has been given it”) and supported by no references. We know
little of the author; a search of the Library of Congress’s catalog indicates he
published a book on business law, and one of forms for conveyances. A search of
nineteenth century case law turns up no citations; the booklet’s one judicial citation
comes after its 1970 reprinting.93 His influence cannot be ranked alongside that of
Tucker, judge and author of the foremost legal text of his day, or Rawle, who had
served in a body that ratified the Bill of Rights.
Conclusion. Numerous early 19th century commentators, including leaders of the
Framing generation, viewed the right to arms as an individual right which either (a)
arose out of a right to self-defense or (b) existed as a precondition of the militia
system, rather than the militia system existing as a precondition of the right. The
one dissenting voice appears to have had no discernable impact upon Americans’
understanding.
B. The Right To Arms In Pre-Civil War American Case Law
Beginning in the 1820s, State courts faced issues arising from the interaction of
early weapons laws, chiefly bans on concealed carry.94 Most rulings upheld the bans
90

Id. at 1474, 1476, 1488-89.

91

BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN; WITH A COMMENTARY ON
STATE RIGHTS, AND ON THE CONSTITUTION AND POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES (reprint 1970)
(1832).
92

Id. at 177.

93

See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1009-10 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).

94

Excellent discussions of case law of this period can be found in STEPHEN P. HALBROOK,
THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 89-98 (1984) and
in Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461,
500-04 (1995).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011

19

334

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:315

as reasonable restrictions on the manner of bearing, since arms could still be carried
openly.
1. Antebellum Case Law Supporting an Individual Right to Arms
Most of the case law of this period arose in the context of newly-enacted bans on
concealed carry of all or certain arms, with the courts treating the right to arms as an
individual one.
The first such case, Bliss v. Commonwealth,95 struck down the Kentucky ban on
concealed carry on the grounds that no restrictions on bearing of arms could be
permissible: “whatever restrains the full and complete exercise of that right, though
not an entire destruction of it, is forbidden . . . .”96 In contrast, concealed weapon
restrictions were upheld as reasonable regulation by Alabama97 and Louisiana.98 The
Alabama court added a caveat: “A statute which, under the pretence of regulating,
amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires arms to be so borne as to
render them wholly useless for the purpose of defence, would be clearly
unconstitutional.”99
The concept was soon given effect in a Georgia decision, Nunn v. State,100 which
struck down a Georgia law which prohibited possession of all except the larger
handguns (“horseman’s pistols”). Georgia had no state right to arms provision, but
the court viewed the Second Amendment as documenting a right which existed
whether enumerated or not. It rejected any claim that the right was limited to militia
service: “The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and
not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every description, and not such merely as
are used by the militia, shall not be infringed . . . .”101
Finally, Tennessee weighed in with a somewhat different approach, which would
find greater popularity later in the century. Its statute prohibited concealed carry
only of Bowie knives and other listed weapons, and the court held that certain nonmilitary weapons were not “arms” within its constitutional guarantee. The weapons
whose carrying was protected were those “usually employed in civilized warfare,”
not those “usually employed in private broils” or “by the robber and the assassin.”102
It reasoned that the purpose of the arms right was so that citizens might “protect the

95

Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822).

96

Id. at 92-93. In 1850, Bliss was overturned by a constitutional amendment. See Eugene
Volokh, State Constitutional Rights To Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 197
(2006).
97

State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840).

98

State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850).

99

Reid, 1 Ala. at 616-17.

100

Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).

101

Id. at 251.

102

Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, 158 (1840).
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public liberty, to keep in awe those who are in power, and to maintain the supremacy
of the laws” and that these needs were best served by military-type weaponry.103
2. Antebellum Case Law Supporting a Military-Use-Only View
This survey is brief. In State v. Buzzard,104 the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a
statute forbidding the concealed carrying of pistols and certain knives, against the
background of a State constitution that had a “for the common defense” limitation.
The three judges divided three ways.
Chief Justice Ringo’s opinion referred to the constitutional language and found
that the militia was “the best security a free state could have,” and that “for this
purpose only, it is conceived the right to keep and bear arms was retained . . . .”105
This understanding is militia-related but not necessarily militia-restricted; the
Tennessee court had used the same understanding to conclude there was an
individual right to possess and use military-type arms, since experience with them
would serve militia purposes. Chief Justice Ringo went on, though, to suggest, first,
that the provision was militia-restricted, allowing a “legal right to keep and bear
arms for that purpose.”106 Alternately, he viewed the concealed weapons ban as
reasonable restriction of a right, since it “inhibits only the wearing of certain arms
concealed. This is simply a regulation as to the manner of bearing such arms as are
specified.”107
Justice Dickinson, concurring, did clearly take a militia-restricted view: “arms
and the right to use them for that purpose [militia] are solely guaranteed.”108
Justice Lacey, in dissent, took a pragmatic view along the lines later espoused by
Thomas Cooley.109 Since the legislature controlled the membership of the militia,
and could exclude whoever it willed, limiting the right to militia use would make a
constitutional right “valueless and not worth preserving.”110
Conclusion. State case law prior to the Civil War, with one less-than-clear
exception, treated the right to arms as an individual right, with no restriction to
militia service. The only questions were: (1) what regulation of the right is permitted
and (2) whether the “arms” protected were only those which are military or militia
suitable. The one exception was a case involving a right to arms “for the common
defense,” where one opinion accepted a militia-restricted view, one rejected it, and a
third seemed to favor it.

103

Id. The court would later hold that this narrowing construction was applicable only to
restrictions on carry, not to those on possession, since while “bear arms” had a military
connotation, to “keep” arms did not. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 141, 156 (1871).
104

State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842).

105

Id. at 24-25.

106

Id. at 25.

107

Id. at 27.

108

Id. at 32 (Dickinson, J., concurring).
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See note 84 and accompanying text infra.
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Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 35.
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III. THE AMERICAN RIGHT TO ARMS AS UNDERSTOOD IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
We can survey American understanding of the period in terms of the abolitionist
movement and its opposition, the understandings displayed in the formulation of the
14th Amendment, and the teachings of case law and commentators during this time.
It is appropriate first to note a historical change spanning the period before and
during this time. As we have seen above, Justice Story’s 1833 Commentaries on the
Constitution complained that the universal, mandatory, militia system was in
decline.111 By that point, Ohio and Delaware had abandoned mandatory militia
service.112 In the 1840s, mandatory militia service was abolished in Massachusetts,
Maine, Ohio, Vermont, Connecticut, New York, and Missouri; New Hampshire
followed in the early 1850s.113 Following the Civil War, even voluntary militia units
faded out in the North; their membership had largely enlisted in the regular forces,
and after four years of fighting, had little interest in additional service.114
Additionally, there was the effect of the Civil War itself, where State resistance to
federal actions or predicted future actions led to the loss of 600,000 lives. Against
this background, the already weak militia-centric approach rapidly declined.
A. The Right to Arms, Abolitionism, and the Reaction to It
We need not weigh evidence here; the historical record is entirely one-sided.
Abolitionist writers (who were themselves at considerable physical risk) universally
viewed the Second Amendment as an individual right linked to self-defense.115
Lysander Spooner, for example, wrote that the right to arms implied the right to use
arms “in defence of life, liberty, chastity, &c.,”116 while Joel Tiffany wrote that “the
right to keep and bear arms, also implies the right to use them if necessary in self
defence; without this right to use the guaranty would hardly have been worth the
paper it consumed.”117
On the pro-slavery side, the infamous Dred Scott case118 accepted this premise.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Taney argued that the states which agreed to
form the United States could not have meant to accept free blacks as citizens, since a
slave State would have to accord entering free blacks “the full liberty of speech in
public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to
111

See note 86 and accompanying text supra.

112

JOHN K. MAHON, HISTORY OF THE MILITIA AND THE NATIONAL GUARD 83 (Louis Morton
ed., 1983); see also New Militia Law, Ohio Repository, March 21, 1814, at 3.
113

MAHON, supra note 112, at 83.

114

MICHAEL D. DOUBLER, CIVILIAN IN PEACE, SOLDIER IN WAR: THE ARMY NATIONAL
GUARD, 1636-2000 110 (2003).
115

See Kopel, supra note 87, at 1435-40.

116

LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
1965) (1860).

OF

SLAVERY 66 (Burt Franklin ed.,

117
JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY:
TOGETHER WITH THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, IN RELATION TO
THAT SUBJECT 117-18 (Mnemosyne Publishing Co., 1969) (1856).
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Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever
they went.”119
This unexpected agreement between abolitionist thinkers and the Dred Scott
majority is paralleled by a concurrence between Republican and Democratic
presidential platforms. The 1856 Republican platform came in the wake of fighting
in “Bleeding Kansas,” where attempts were made to disarm the anti-slavery side.
The Republican platform argued “the dearest Constitutional rights of the people of
Kansas have been fraudulently and violently taken from them . . . . The right of the
people to keep and bear arms has been infringed.”120
Conversely, after the outbreak of the Civil War, Union forces searched some
Maryland homes for arms. With the shoe on the other foot, the 1864 Democratic
platform protested the imposition of martial law, “the suppression of freedom of
speech and of the press . . . and the interference with and denial of the right of the
people to bear arms in their defense.”121
Conclusion. The 1850s saw the most bitter of divides between abolitionists and
the defenders of slavery. But abolitionists and Chief Justice Taney, and Republicans
and Democrats, agreed that the right to keep and bear arms was an individual one.
B. The Right to Arms and the Fourteenth Amendment
Here, too, the relevant evidence is one-sided. The historical record was
extensively explored in McDonald v. Chicago: the majority points out,122 and the
dissents do not deny, that when Congress considered the Fourteenth Amendment, the
right to arms was frequently cited as one of the rights meant to be protected, and that
all these references viewed it as an individual right unrelated to militia service.123
119
Id. at 417. Taney’s underlying reasoning takes a bit of explanation. He appears to be
relying on Article IV § 2’s requirement that States allow citizens of other States the
“privileges and immunities” of their own citizens, and that in so doing the visited State could
not discriminate based on the race of the visitor. This view seems related to early case law
construing Article IV § 2 as protecting visitors to a State against deprivation of rights of
citizens of the United States, in the sense of the national entity. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.
Cas. 545 (C.C.E.D. Pa 1823). Modern case law treats that provision as forbidding States to
deprive visitors of major rights the State accords its own citizens. See Baldwin v. Fish and
Game Comm’n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 384 (1978); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395
(1948).
120

DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON & KIRK H. PORTER, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1972
27 (1973).
121

Id. at 34.

122

McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3038-41 (2010).

123

In his Heller dissent, Justice Stevens speculated that references to violations of the right
to arms might have referred to disarming of the Reconstruction era “Negro Militias.” District
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 679-71 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). He does not
reassert this in his McDonald dissent. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). In fact, at the time of
Congressional debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, these militias had not yet been formed,
let alone destroyed. In 1866, the southern militias were all-white, and largely bent upon
disarming and terrorizing blacks. OTIS A. SINGLETARY, NEGRO MILITIA AND RECONSTRUCTION
5 (1957); ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR; THE KU KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND
SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION xxii (1971). Thus the complaint in the 39th Congress that the
southern militias would rather “hang some freedman or search negro houses for arms.”
CONG. GLOBE, 39th CONG., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 941 (1866).
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The Reconstruction Congress underscored this view when, in 1867, it voted to
order dissolution of the Southern militias,124 while refraining from disarming their
members out of concern that that would violate the Second Amendment.
The dissolution bill began as a proposal by Senator Wilson which would have
commanded that the militias (which he denounced as bands of former rebels bent
upon terrorizing the freedmen) “be forthwith disarmed and disbanded . . . .”125 On
the floor, Senator Willey objected: “It strikes me also that there may be some
constitutional objection against depriving men of the right to bear arms and the total
disarming of men in time of peace.”126
Senator Wilson responded that he was willing to “modify the amendment by
striking out the word ‘disarmed.’ Then it will provide simply for disbanding these
organizations.”127 Senator Willey found the amended bill, which dissolved militia
units but preserved the individual right to arms for these former enemies, “much
more acceptable to me than it was originally,”128 and in that form it was enacted.129
C. The Right to Arms in Postwar Courts and Commentators
Postwar courts faced right to arms issues at both state and federal levels. Both
bodies of the judiciary treat the right as an individual one, not limited to military
service, and state courts focused on determining its boundaries.
1. Postwar State Case Law
Most legal challenges of this period arose out of a wave of enactments barring
carrying (but not ownership) of non-gun weapons such as bowie knives, sharply
pointed daggers known as “Arkansas toothpicks,” and impact weapons such as brass
knuckles and “slung shots.”130 Some enactments also extended to carrying of small
handguns. (In the vernacular of the time, handguns were divided into “holster” or
“horse” pistols, very large firearms holstered on the saddle, “belt” pistols of standard
military size suitable for carry in a belt, and “pocket” pistols, the smallest class of
handguns).
The best-reasoned case of the period came from Tennessee. Andrews v. State131
held overbroad a ban on carrying (openly or concealed) a “belt or pocket pistol or
revolver.”132 The ruling came against an unusually extensive legal background.
124

Act of March 2, 1867, § 6, 14 Stat. 487.

125

CONG. GLOBE, 39th CONG., 2d Sess. 1848 (1867).

126

Id.

127

CONG. GLOBE, 39th CONG., 2d Sess. 1849 (1867).

128

Id.

129

Act of March 2, 1867, § 6, 14 Stat. 487.

130

Slung shots were not slingshots, but blackjacks, pocket-sized flexible clubs with a
weighted end.
131

Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165 (1871).

132

Id. at *3. Pistols were then roughly classed by how they were customarily carried. The
largest were “horse pistols,” heavy cavalry weapons (by then outdated) meant to be holstered
on the saddle. Then came “belt pistols,” of a size and weight to be carried in a belt holster.
The smallest were “pocket pistols.”
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Defending the statute, the Attorney General argued for a militia-use-only
interpretation: “it is the bearing of arms, not for private broils and purposes of blood,
but in defense of a common cause; as citizen soldiers bearing arms for the defense,
in common with each other; not commonly; i.e., on ordinary occasions.”133
The Andrews court rejected his view. Indeed, it reasoned that the right to “keep”
covered certain forms of carrying arms; its purpose was to ensure that a citizen was
sufficiently proficient in their use to participate in the common defense, and that
implied a right to transport ordinary firearms for practice.134
Arkansas enacted carrying restrictions similar to those of Tennessee, and its
rulings tracked those of that state. Fife v. State135 involved a defendant charged with
“carrying a pistol as a weapon.”136 The court avoided constitutional problems by
construing the ban to cover only small handguns, “used in private quarrels and
brawls,” and not ones of military size.137 Later, in Wilson v. State,138 the court held
the ban was invalid as applied to a full-sized revolver: “to prohibit the citizen from
wearing or carrying a war arm . . . is an unwarranted restriction upon his
constitutional right to keep and bear arms.”139
Other courts accepted the reasoning of the Tennessee and Arkansas rulings. In
English v. State,140 a Texas court upheld that state’s ban on carrying various knives
and small handguns with the note that “[t]he terms dirks, daggers, slungshots, swordcanes, brass-knuckles and bowie knives, belong to no military vocabulary.”141 Still
others treated limits on carrying as raising the issue of reasonable regulation of a
constitutional right.142 In several of these decisions the State cited the militia-useonly ruling in State v. Buzzard, but no court took the decision seriously enough to
mention it.143
133

50 Tenn. at *2 (emphasis added).

134

Id. at *7.

135

Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876).

136

He had done more than carry it: testimony indicated he had stuck it in another man’s
face. Id. at *1.
137

Id. at *4.

138

Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (1878).

139

Id. at *2 (emphasis added). See also Dabbs v. State, 39 Ark. 353 (1882). At issue in
Dabbs was a ban on sale of small revolvers (those not used by the Army or Navy). The
Attorney General cited State v. Buzzard for the proposition that the right to arms “may be
absolutely prohibited,” Dabbs, 39 Ark. At *1, but the court cited Fife, holding that the statute
“in no wise restrains the use or sale of such arms as are useful in warfare.” Id. at *3.
140

English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1872).

141

Id. at *3.

142

See State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528 (1881) (construing a ban on carrying into public
assemblies as forbidding concealed carry only, and citing State v. Reid, 1Ala. 612 (1840), as
to regulation); see also State v. Shelby, 90 Mo. 302 (1886) (construing the same as to carrying
while intoxicated); State v. Rosenthal, 75 Vt. 295 (1903) (striking down municipal ban on
concealed carry).
143

See Dabbs, 39 Ark. at *1; Wilforth, 74 Mo. At *1.
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In short, it is clear that state courts of the period took seriously a right to arms,
and treated it as an individual right. At most, they allowed that the right might be
limited to arms of a military nature, or (more broadly) arms whose use gave skills
that might enable a citizen to participate in the common defense.
2. Postwar Federal Case Law
The Supreme Court likewise gave no indication that it saw the right to arms as
restricted to militia service. In United State v. Cruikshank,144 the issue was whether
the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause made the federal rights
to assemble and to keep and bear arms applicable to the States. Cruikshank was a
Louisiana sheriff who was one of the leaders in the infamous Colfax Courthouse
Massacre, where a mob broke up an assembly of blacks, disarmed them, and then
killed over a hundred of them.145
The relevant clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade States to abridge “the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” The Cruikshank Court
eviscerated this by holding that: (1) this could only describe rights created (as
opposed to guaranteed) by the U.S. Constitution, and (2) these did not include rights
that could be seen as natural, inherent in any free government, and thus pre-existing
the creation of U.S. citizenship.146 Thus the Court ruled the right to assemble and the
right to arms outside the protections of the privileges or immunities clause, because
they had pre-existed their written guarantee:
The particular amendment now under consideration assumes the existence
of the right of the people to assemble for lawful purposes, and protects it
against encroachment by Congress. The right was not created by the
amendment; neither was its continuance guaranteed, except as against
congressional interference.
....
The second and tenth counts are equally defective. The right there
specified is that of “bearing arms for a lawful purpose.” This is not a
right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent
upon that instrument for its existence.147
It is easy to see how an individual right to arms for self-defense could be
characterized as a natural right that pre-existed the Constitution. It is quite hard to
see how a right to engage in organized militia activities could meet that description.
3. Postwar Constitutional Commentators
As with the courts, so with the commentators of the late 19th century. The
leading constitutional commentator of the period was Thomas Cooley, Michigan
Supreme Court justice and professor of law, considered by one scholar to have been
144

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).

145

See generally CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE,
SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008).
146

Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552-53.

147

Id.
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Amendment, Cooley wrote:

341

Of the Second

The Right is General. — It may be supposed from the phraseology of this
provision that the right to keep and bear arms was only guaranteed to the
militia; but this would be an interpretation not warranted by the intent.
The militia, as has been elsewhere explained, consists of those persons
who, under the law, are liable to the performance of military duty, and are
officered and enrolled for service when called upon. But the law may
make provision for the enrolment of all who are fit to perform military
duty, or of a small number only, or it may wholly omit to make any
provision at all; and if the right were limited to those enrolled, the purpose
of this guaranty might be defeated altogether by the action or neglect to
act of the government it was meant to hold in check. The meaning of the
provision undoubtedly is, that the people, from whom the militia must be
taken, shall have the right to keep and bear arms, and they need no
permission or regulation of law for the purpose. But this enables the
government to have a well-regulated militia; for to bear arms implies
something more than the mere keeping; it implies the learning to handle
and use them in a way that makes those who keep them ready for their
efficient use; in other words, it implies the right to meet for voluntary
discipline in arms, observing in doing so the laws of public order.149
The other great commentator of the period was Joel Bishop, famed for his analysis of
the criminal law. His Commentaries on the Criminal Law treated the right to arms
as an individual right, albeit one excluding non-military arms and criminal uses.
The constitution of the United States provides, that, “a well-regulated
militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” This provision is
found among the amendments; and, though most of the amendments are
restrictions on the General Government alone, not on the States, this one
seems to be of a nature to bind both the State and National legislatures.
If, however, we look to the question of its interpretation in the light of
judicial reason, without the aid of specific authority, we shall be led to the
conclusion, that the provision protects only the right to “keep” such
“arms” as are used for purposes of war, in distinction from those which
are employed in quarrels and brawls and fights between maddened
individuals; since such, only, are properly known by the name of arms;
and such, only, are adapted to promote “the security of a free State.” In
like manner, the right to “bear” arms refers merely to the military way of
using them, not to their use in bravado and affray. Still, the Georgia
tribunal seems to have held, that a statute prohibiting the open wearing of
arms upon the person violates this provision of the constitution, though a
statute against the wearing of the arms concealed does not. And, in
148
See Stephen A. Siegal, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought,
1990 WIS. L. REV. 1431, 1485 n.302.
149

THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 282-83 (Boston, Little Brown, and Co. 2d ed. 1891).
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accord with the latter branch of this Georgia doctrine, the Louisiana court
has laid it down, that the statute against carrying concealed weapons does
not infringe the constitutional right of the people to keep and bear arms;
for this statute is a measure of police, prohibiting only a particular mode
of bearing arms, found dangerous to the community.150
Conclusion. By the end of the Nineteenth Century, acceptance of a purely
individual right to arms was literally universal. Congress, federal and state courts,
and commentators all saw the right to arms as having no restriction to militia duties.
The only issues were to what extent this private right could be regulated, and
whether its “arms” included weapons more suited to brawling and street crime than
to resistance to political oppression.
IV. THE MILITIA-RESTRICTED RIGHT TO ARMS’ ORIGINS IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY
We are left with a paradox. If the militia-uses-only view was unknown to the
Framers, and nearly so to courts, Congress, and commentators for a century after the
Framing, whence did it arise?
The evidence indicates that the collective right view (1) had a tentative origin in
the early 20th century; (2) it began to gain ground in the mid-century based upon
policy considerations (primarily the need to sustain the National Firearms Act’s
restrictions upon machine guns and related arms) rather than law or history; (3) it
gained widespread acceptance among lower federal courts in the 1960s, and
thereafter as a means of upholding firearm laws in general.
The Supreme Court’s rejection of collective rights in District of Columbia v.
Heller was thus no legal novelty; it was simply a refusal to accept a recent invention
of lower courts. We will examine the 20th century trend in three parts. The first will
be the right to arms as it was seen prior to United States v. Miller;151 the second will
be its treatment in Miller; the third will discuss the lower court reactions to Miller,
and the countering reaction from the legal academy.
A. The Right to Arms 1900 – 1939
1. 1905: City of Salina v. Blaksley
Early in the century came the first clear use, and the first use since State v.
Buzzard, of a militia-use-only reading of a state constitution. The case arose in
Kansas, whose right to arms clause did have an exceptionally military context. The
constitutional provision referred only to bearing, and not keeping, of arms, had a link
to the people’s “defense and security,” and was accompanied by two references to
clearly military affairs: “The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and
security; but standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not
be tolerated, and the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power.”152
In 1905, James Blaksley was charged with possessing (and apparently firing) a
firearm while intoxicated, in violation of a city ordinance. Blaksley appealed his
150

2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 124 (Boston, Little
Brown, and Co. 3d ed. 1865).
151

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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See Volokh, supra note 96, at 196.
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misdemeanor conviction all the way to the Kansas Supreme Court, which showed
little sympathy for litigious, armed drunks, and affirmed his conviction.
An interesting feature of Blaksley was that neither party contended that the right
to arms was limited to militia service, likely because there was almost no precedent
supporting such an approach (State v. Buzzard is not cited in the Kansas ruling and
apparently was undiscovered by the court). The State argued that the right to arms
was limited to military-type arms, whereas Blaksley had fired off a small .32 caliber
pocket pistol; it also contended that a restriction on carrying while intoxicated was a
reasonable regulation of the right.153 Blaksley, on the other hand, contended that the
right to arms was absolute, protecting both pocket pistols and carrying while
intoxicated.154
The Kansas court came up with its own rationale, noting that the state provision,
taken in context, “deals exclusively with the military. Individual rights are not
considered in this section.”155 It treated the Second Amendment (which had no such
context) in the same way: “The right of the people to keep and bear arms for their
security is preserved, and the manner of bearing them for such purpose is clearly
indicated to be as a member of a well-regulated militia, or some other military
organization provided for by law.”156
The court cited two authorities, neither of which supported its position. The first
was Joel Bishop’s Commentaries on The Law of Statutory Crimes,157 from which it
took a passage stating, “the keeping and bearing of arms has reference only to war
and possibly also to insurrections wherein the forms of war are, as far as practicable
observed.”158 One is left wondering what Bishop was thinking when he wrote of a
constitutional right to bear arms in insurrections! The court’s citation actually omits
part of the relevant sentence: “In reason the keeping and bearing of arms has
reference only to war and possibly also to insurrections wherein the forms of war
are, as far as practicable observed”; yet certainly not to broils, bravado, and tumult,
disturbing the public repose, or to private assassination and secret revenge.159
Bishop is explaining (rather clumsily) that the right to arms relates to enabling
political resistance and does not cover criminal use.
Blaksley’s second reference was to Commonwealth v. Murphy,160 which had
upheld a statute forbidding non-militia organizations to drill and parade with
firearms. The state court held that “it is within the police power of the legislature to
regulate the bearing of arms, so as to forbid such unauthorized drills and parades.”161
153
See Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 59, 77 n.124 (1989).
154

Id.
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City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619, 620 (Kan. 1905).

156

Id.
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JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF STATUTORY CRIMES §§ 792-93
(Boston, Little Brown, and Co. 2d ed. 1883).
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Salina, 83 P. at 620.

159

Id.

160

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 44 N.E. 138 (Mass. 1896).
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Id. at 138.
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Murphy was a “reasonable regulation” ruling, not one holding that the bearing of
arms was only protected during militia duty.
2. 1915: Lucilius Emery’s Harvard Law Review Article
A decade after the decision, Blaksley formed the basis of an article in the Harvard
Law Review, by Lucilius Emery.162 The article’s tone was tentative, its author
beginning with note that his arguments referred only to bearing arms, not to keeping
them: “I think there are deducible several propositions as to the power of the
legislature to restrict and even forbid carrying weapons by individuals, however
powerless it may be as to the simple possessing or keeping weapons.”163
First, he noted that legislatures might control the carrying of weapons that are not
suited for use in civilized warfare, such as daggers and brass knuckles. This was of
course in accord with existing precedent. Second, he suggested that only men
suitable for military service should be protected. “Women, young boys, the blind,
tramps, persons non compos mentis, or dissolute in habits, may be prohibited from
carrying weapons.”164 This would fit under the concept of reasonable (or in many
cases, unreasonable) regulation. He ended on an ambiguous note:
Lastly, I submit that the right guaranteed is not so much to the individual
for his private quarrels or feuds as to the people collectively for the
common defense against the common enemy, foreign or domestic. The
guaranty is to insure the safety of the people, their “laws and liberties,”
against assaults from any source or quarter, but not to give individuals
singly or in groups uncontrollable means of aggression upon the rights of
others. Granting that the individual may carry weapons when necessary
for his personal defense or that of his family or property, it is submitted
that he may be forbidden to carry dangerous weapons except in cases
where he has reason to believe and does believe that it is necessary for
such defense.165
3. Reception of the “Militia-Uses-Only” Concept in Case Law Prior to 1939
Neither Blaksley nor the article spawned a trend in case law. Early Twentieth
Century courts continued to treat the right to arms as an individual right. Thus In Re
Brickey166 invalidated an Idaho law banning carrying of handguns within cities and
towns, holding that it violated both the State constitution and the Second
Amendment. In Glasscock v. City of Chattanooga,167 the Supreme Court of
Tennessee held that a city ordinance forbidding the carrying of handguns offended

162

Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV.
473 (1915). While the article does not mention Blaksley, it appropriates its sources, down to
the incomplete quotation from Joel Bishop.
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Id. at 476.

164

Id.
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Id. at 477.
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In re Brickey, 70 P. 609 (Idaho 1902).
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Glasscock v. City of Chattanooga, 11 S.W.2d 678 (Tenn. 1928).
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the State guarantee of a right to arms. People v. Zerillo168 struck down a Michigan
statute requiring noncitizens to obtain a permit before possessing a revolver. People
v. Nakamura169 struck down a similar Colorado law, the court refusing to accept the
State’s claim that the right to arms was “one of collective enjoyment for common
defense.”170 State v. Kerner171 invalidated a North Carolina statute that required a
permit for open carry of a handgun. The ruling had an interesting populist twist:
To exclude all pistols, however, is not a regulation, but a prohibition, of
arms which come under the designation of “arms” which the people are
entitled to bear. This is not an idle or an obsolete guaranty, for there are
still localities, not necessary to mention, where great corporations, under
the guise of detective agents or private police, terrorize their employees
by armed force. If the people are forbidden to carry the only arms within
their means, among them pistols, they will be completely at the mercy of
these great plutocratic organizations.172
Even within Kansas itself, Blaksley had an uncertain acceptance. A 1975
ruling173 treated it as good law, but a 1979 decision,174 holding a firearm law
unconstitutional due to overbreadth, cast doubt upon this. As this article was being
written, Kansas voters amended its Bill of Rights to recognize a clearly individual
right, mooting the Blaksley holding.175
Conclusion. It is apparent that while the period 1900-1939 saw the birth of the
collective rights theory, the infant failed to thrive. It was the invention of a state
court, so novel that neither party had briefed the theory, and arose out of the unique
wording of the State guarantee. Other state courts continued to treat the right to
arms as an individual one. Blaksley gave rise to no case law, and Emery’s
ambiguous article failed even to spawn more articles.
B. 1939: United States v. Miller
1. Miller in the District Court
In 1934, Congress passed the first significant federal firearms measure. The
National Firearms Act of that year imposed a $200 excise tax (and through its
168

People v. Zerillo, 189 N.W. 927 (Mich. 1922).

169

People v. Nakamura, 62 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1936).

170

Id. at 247-48.

171

State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222 (N.C. 1921).

172

Id. at 225 (emphasis added).

173

Junction City v. Lee, 532 P.2d 1292 (Kan. 1975).

174

Junction City v. Mevis, 601 P.2d 1145, 1151 (Kan. 1979).

175

Section four of the Kansas Bill of Rights presently provides: “Individual right to bear
arms; armies: A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family,
home and state, for lawful hunting and recreational use, and for any other lawful purpose; but
standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be tolerated, and the
military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power.” Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 4
(2010).
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reporting, registration) upon a narrow class of firearms, chiefly machine guns and
short barreled (“sawed off”176) shotguns and rifles.177
Five years later, in United States v. Miller,178 the U.S. Supreme Court had an
opportunity to pass upon the constitutionality of this measure. It managed a ruling
so ambiguous that seventy years later its core meaning was still in dispute: in
District of Columbia v. Heller, both majority and the dissent could make a decent
claim to Miller’s support.179 Miller’s only halfway clear holding was that perhaps
not every tax on everything that goes “bang!” will, by that fact alone, come within
the protection of the Second Amendment. Miller’s real significance is not what it
said, but what lower courts could later read it to say. It is thus important to grasp
how completely muddled — and probably collusive — the case was from its very
outset.
The defendants, Jackson “Jack” Miller and Frank Layton, were a pair of bank
robbers; Miller in particular had followed the hazardous course of alternating his
criminal career with snitching out his cohorts in exchange for leniency.180 Their
transportation of an untaxed short-barreled shotgun earned them an indictment in the
Western District of Arkansas, Judge Heartsill Ragon presiding.
Citing the Second Amendment and no other authority, Judge Ragon dismissed
the indictment.181 Perhaps because it had failed to appeal in time, the government reindicted Miller and Layton, and Ragon again dismissed.182
Judge Ragon’s actions gave the government a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court.183 Since they were taken without evidentiary findings or, indeed any
evidence, the dismissal could only be sustained if the Second Amendment was so
absolute that even machineguns and sawed-off shotguns were protected against
registration and taxation.
Seventy years later, Brian L. Frye explored the history of the case, and reached
the remarkable conclusion that the appeal was almost certainly collusive.184 Judge
Ragon had, before being appointed to the bench, served for many years in the U.S.
House of Representatives, where he introduced, endorsed, and supported federal
firearms laws.185 He argued on the floor that “I am unequivocally opposed to pistols
in any connection whatever” and dismissed Second Amendment concerns with the
176
“Sawed off” became the popular term, although a shotgun could fall within NFA
without its barrel being sawed off (some shotguns were then being made with barrels already
shorter than the NFA threshold) or could be sawed off without coming within NFA (provided
the barrel was not shortened to less than the statutory threshold).
177

See 26 U.S.C. § 5811 (2006).

178

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).

179

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

180

See Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB.
48 (2008).
181

United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Ark. 1938).

182

Id.

183

See Criminal Appeals Act, 34 Stat. 1246 (Supp. 1907) and 28 U.S.C. § 345 (1940).

184

See Frye, supra note 180.

185

Id. at 64.
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observation that his State had prohibited pistol sales and the measure had been
upheld.186 (In this, Rep. Ragon was mistaken.)187 It is hard to explain why a judge
who believed that an absolute ban on ordinary pistol sales passed constitutional
muster, would believe that registering and taxing sawed-off shotguns was facially
unconstitutional.
Research into Judge Ragon’s papers at the University of Arkansas188 casts little
light on Miller itself: while Judge Ragon was a prolific writer, no extant document
mentions the ruling. Several things did, however, stand out.
First, the District Court had little in the way of research tools, and nothing that
would have led Judge Ragon to change his mind on the right to arms. He was quite
proud that the District Court had acquired a set of United States Code Annotated for
each of its four courthouses.189 The Federal Supplement was a scarcer commodity;
apparently the courthouses had to share a single set.190 That reporter’s one relevant
reference was to another District Court which had sustained the National Firearms
Act as constitutional.191
Second, Judge Ragon remained a Washington insider even while on the bench.
His judicial correspondence files were mundane, consisting of granting excuses from
jury duty or brushing aside requests that he recommend parole. His political files
were anything but mundane. He wrote Rep. William Bankhead, coaching him on his
run against Sam Rayburn for Speaker of the House, and reporting a head count of the
Arkansas delegation on the matter.192 He reported to Secretary of State Cordell Hull
on conditions in Mexico,193 and wrote President Roosevelt on behalf of Arkansas’

186

Id.

187
The legislation challenged had outlawed sale of non-military-type pistols, i.e. pocket
pistols, and while it had been upheld, the only reference to the State right to arms was the note
that “it in no wise restrains the use or sale of such arms as are useful in warfare.” Dabbs v.
State, 39 Ark. 353, 357 (1882).
188

Heartsill Ragon Papers, University of Arkansas at Little Rock Archives and Special
Collections.
189

Letter from Heartsill Ragon, Judge, W.D. Ark., to L.S. Mercer, Editorial Counsel, West
Publ’g Co. (April 28, 1939) (on file with the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Archives
and Special Collections).
190

Letter from Heartsill Ragon, Judge, W.D. Ark., to Lowell Gibbons, Deputy U.S. Dist.
Court Clerk, W.D. Ark. (December 6, 1938) (on file with the University of Arkansas at Little
Rock Archives and Special Collections).
191
United States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 216, 218-19 (S.D. Fla. 1935) (“The Constitution
does not grant the privilege to racketeers and desperadoes to carry weapons of the character
dealt with in the act.”).
192
Letter from Heartsill Ragon, Judge, W.D. Ark., to William Bankhead, U.S.
Representative, Ark. (September 15, 1934) (on file with the University of Arkansas at Little
Rock Archives and Special Collections).
193

Letter from Heartsill Ragon, Judge, W.D. Ark., to Cordell Hull, Sec’y of State, U.S.
(July 21, 1938) (on file with the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Archives and Special
Collections). The letter closes with “Mrs. Ragon joins me in kindest personal regards to you
and Mrs. Hull.” Id.
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governor.194 During “an hour or two of recess from the court,” he wrote a letter
endorsing another Arkansas Representative’s desire to succeed him on House Ways
and Means.195 Yet another letter urges Sen. Hattie Caraway to obtain a government
post for “Beanie” Bell, “the most effective political worker in Sebastian County . . . .
You will need him daily in this section when your campaign gets in action.”196
Judge Ragon’s plan was detailed:
Now, what I want you to do is to go down and see Attorney General
Cummings personally and tell him that you want this man; that it means a
lot to you personally. Now, don’t telephone or don’t let Garrett
telephone, but go down there personally and see the Attorney General and
you will have no trouble. Now, Mrs. Caraway, I can’t over emphasize the
importance of this to you. I am writing the Attorney General today . . . .197
Judge Ragon also had close ties with Treasury’s Alcohol Tax Unit, which was
charged with enforcing the National Firearms Act and would have approved the
charges against Miller. The Unit’s District Supervisor was John J. Burkett.198 While
Miller was under advisement in the Supreme Court, Ragon wrote a member of the
House, describing Burkett as “a lifelong, close, personal friend of mine,” and asking
for his promotion in light of “the smooth running of the Alcohol Tax United under
his supervision.”199
Judge Ragon’s role an Administration “insider” must be placed in political
context. The FDR administration was then seeking greatly to expand the federal law
enforcement role, and establishing broad federal control over firearms was a key
component of this campaign. Its legislative successes were the 1934 National
Firearms Act, discussed above, and the 1938 Federal Firearms Act,200 which for the
first time applied federal controls to commerce in ordinary firearms. The
Administration – and in particular Attorney General Homer Cummings and his
assistant Joseph B. Keenan – spent much of the period from 1934 through 1938
seeking still more.

194

Letter from Heartsill Ragon, Judge, W.D. Ark., to Charles Brough, Governor, Ark.
(March 1, 1934) (on file with the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Archives and Special
Collections).
195

Letter from Heartsill Ragon, Judge, W.D. Ark., to Robert L. Doughton, U.S.
Representative, N.C. (January 8, 1934) (on file with the University of Arkansas at Little Rock
Archives and Special Collections).
196
Letter from Heartsill Ragon, Judge, W.D. Ark., to Hattie Caraway, U.S. Senator, Ark.
(April 30, 1938) (on file with the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Archives and Special
Collections).
197

Id.

198

Letter from Heartsill Ragon, Judge, W.D. Ark., to John J. Cochran, U.S. Representative,
Mo. (April 10, 1939) (on file with the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Archives and
Special Collections).
199

Id.

200

Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, § 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250, 1250-51 (1938) (current version at
18 U.S.C.A. § 921 (West 2011)).
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In a 1934 speech, Cummings had listed among his twelve highest priorities: “A
law to regulate the importation, manufacture or sale, or other disposition of machine
guns and concealable firearms.”201 The National Firearms Act was actually
something of a disappointment to him. As originally proposed, it had required
registration, not just of machineguns and short-barreled long arms, but also of
handguns. The extension to handguns was, however, removed in committee
consideration; Keenan responded with a speech denouncing the deletion, to no
avail.202
Cummings spent much of the period from 1935 through 1938 seeking to restore
the deletion, and to enact further national firearm measures. Among Cummings’
papers is a 1935 memorandum from Joseph Keenan, proposing to seek new
legislation to include pistols within the National Firearms Act, and in the longer term
(preceded by a public relations campaign) to push for tight firearm permit
requirements along the lines of those of Great Britain.203 The following year
Cummings published magazine articles endorsing national handgun registration,204
and in 1937 and 1938 he campaigned to extend those requirements to rifles and
shotguns as well.205
In short, the FDR Administration viewed extensive federal firearm controls, right
up to national registration and permit systems for all firearms, as a high legislative
priority. Judge Ragon was a political insider who had argued that even firearm bans
were constitutional. He was an unlikely man to “go activist,” with a ruling that
would bar as unconstitutional the entire arena of national firearm controls. If the
federal government could not register even machine guns and sawed-off shotguns, it
is hard to see what it could do in the area of firearm controls.
On the other hand, if Judge Ragon wanted to arrange a test case that would
remove the Second Amendment as a barrier to the Administration’s plans, Miller’s
case was near-perfect: a Second Amendment challenge to registration of sawed-off
shotguns, brought by a bank robber, after a cursory ruling that handed the
government a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
2. Miller in the Supreme Court
If that was Judge Ragon’s purpose, his move seemed destined for success. On
March 15, the Clerk of the Supreme Court wrote Miller’s attorney, Paul Gutensohn,
informing him the Court had taken the case and it would be argued on March 31!206
201

SELECTED PAPERS OF HOMER CUMMINGS: ATTORNEY GENERAL
1933-1939 38 (Carl Brent Swisher ed., 1972).

OF THE

UNITED STATES

202

Thomas Earl Mahl, A History of Individual and Group Action in Promoting National
Gun Control Legislation During the Interwar Period, 1919-1941 153-54 (Aug. 1972)
(unpublished Master’s thesis, Kent State University ) (on file with Kent State University
Libraries).
203
Memorandum from Joseph B. Keenan, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Homer Cummings,
Attorney Gen. (Nov. 20, 1935) (on file with the University of Virginia Library, collection
9973).
204

Editorial, Cummings wants “G-Men” Stronger; In Dodge's Magazine He Asks
Congress to Pass Law to Register All Pistols., N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1936, at 34.
205

Mahl, supra note 202, at 184-87.
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FRYE, supra note 180, at 67.
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A week later Gutensohn wrote back, stating that he had not even received the
government’s brief.207 On March 25, the Clerk replied that
You are correct in your understanding that the appellant is required to file
a brief, and ordinarily appellant’s brief is required to be filed three weeks
before the date of argument. Toward the end of the Term cases are
reached so promptly after preliminary consideration that it is very often
impossible to comply with the rules as to the filing of briefs and the
argument of the cases is not delayed for that reason.208
The Clerk added the government had provided Gutensohn with a typewritten brief,
and that Gutensohn could file his brief in the next week, or argument could be put
over to April 17.209
Gutensohn was having none of it. On March 28, he telegraphed the Clerk:
US VS MILLER ET AL NUMBER 696 – SUGGEST CASE BE
SUBMITTED ON APPELLANTS BRIEF. UNABLE TO OBTAIN
ANY MONEY FROM CLIENTS TO BE ABLE TO PRESENT &
ARGUE CASE
PAUL E. GUTENSOHN.210
Apparently concerned that he had not been entirely clear as to the briefing, he
followed the next day with “DO NOT INTEND TO FILE BRIEF = PAUL E.
GUTENSOHN.”211
The stage seemed set for a decision that would narrow, if not negate, the Second
Amendment. Judge Ragon’s order had given the government a direct appeal of a
decision that could only be defended under an absolutist view of the Amendment’s
meaning. Gutensohn’s decision meant there would no opposing brief – indeed, he
was recommending that the case be decided based on the government’s arguments.
Then fate took a hand.
207

Id.

208

Letter from Clerk of the Court to Paul E. Guntensohn, March 25, 1939, National
Archives, file for United States v. Miller, No. 696, O.T. 1938. By modern standards, this
seems incredibly rushed and informal. After consulting files for other cases taken late in the
Term, and now housed at National Archives, it appears to have been standard procedure then.
In Maytag v. Hurley, No. 76, certiorari was granted on April 1, 1939, and argument set for the
session of April 17. In United States v. Marxen, No. 544, counsel telegraphed that he had
only yesterday received the order setting argument for tomorrow, and he could possibly travel
to D.C. in that time. The Clerk wired back informing him that the Court hadn’t reached the
case on the date given, and would be argued in two weeks. In Lane v. Wilson, No. 460,
certiorari was granted on January 18, and argument was set for the week of February 6, unless
it were held over for the week of February 27. The Clerk instructed counsel to inquire on
Saturday, February 4, whether argument would go in the next week or not.
209

FRYE, supra note 180, at 67.

210

National Archives, file for United State v. Miller, No. 696, O.T. 1938.
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Id.
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Probably because of the time pressures involved, especially in a case of first
impression, the government filed a rambling brief with little internal organization.212
Its arguments can be outlined as:
1.

2.

3.
4.

The common law allowed regulation of the carrying of exceptionally
“dangerous or unusual” weapons; this argument then merged into the
1689 Declaration of Rights’ recognition of a right to arms “suitable to
their conditions and as allowed by law.”
This was followed by a reference to a “collective rights” concept; the
right related to “arming of the people as a body” to deter tyranny, not to
“keeping of arms for purposes of private defense.”213
An argument that the purpose of the right to arms was to avoid creation
of a standing army (rather a moot point by 1939).
An argument that the “arms” whose possession is protected refers only
to weapons of military or militia use. The government cited Aymette,
Fife and other cases, and argued that a sawed-off shotgun was a weapon
of gangsters rather than of militiamen.

If the case were to be decided upon the government’s position, it was going to
take some effort to ascertain what that position was. And here the human factor came
into play.
The Chief Justice assigned the Miller opinion to Justice James McReynolds.
This probably reflects the low priority given the case, which had been presented with
one side poorly briefed, and the other not briefed at all.
McReynolds was, to put it charitably, not a Justice to be entrusted with a
significant constitutional ruling. He was a racist, anti-Semite, misogynist, and
undifferentiated bigot: Chief Justice Taft described him as “fuller of prejudice than
any man I have ever known,” and “selfish to the last degree.”214 Historians disagree
on whether Woodrow Wilson nominated him to the bench to get him out of his
position as Attorney General, where he had alienated much of the Cabinet.215 On
the Court, he repeated his performance, shunning and insulting the other Justices.216
More to the point, Reynolds was incredibly lazy and slipshod. The Chief Justice
considered him a man with “no sense of duty,” in good part because of his tendency
212

The text of the government’s brief may be found at http://www.guncite.com/millerbrief.htm.
213
“Such recognition as existed of a right in the people to keep and bear arms appears to
have resulted from oppression by rulers who disarmed their political opponents and who
organized large standing armies which were obnoxious and burdensome to the people. 1
COOLEY’S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 729 (8th ed.); see also 28 HARV. L. REV. 473. This
right, however, it is clear, gave sanction only to the arming of the people as a body to defend
their rights against tyrannical and unprincipled rulers. It did not permit the keeping of arms
for purposes of private defense.”
214

ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 215 (1965).

215

Cf. JOHN KNOX, THE FORGOTTEN MEMOIR OF JOHN KNOX 265 (2002), with JAMES E.
BOND, I DISSENT: THE LEGACY OF CHIEF JUSTICE JAMES CLARK MCREYNOLDS 49-50 (1992)
(the title erroneously describes Reynolds as Chief Justice).
216

MASON, supra note 214, at 217; BOND, supra note 215, at 53-55.
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to go duck-hunting, with no notice, while leaving opinions unwritten.217 When he
did write, he was cursory. “McReynold’s opinions ran short because, as in Hopkins
v. Hebard, he cited little supporting authority and did not discuss the authority he did
cite . . . . In some opinions he declined to cite case authority at all.”218 An
examination of Justice McReynolds’ contributions to October Term 1938 confirms
this evaluation. The signed opinions of that Term span 1,778 pages.219 To that,
McReynolds’ opinions contributed 97 pages, mostly comprising remarkably brief
rulings.220
It is also apparent that the Chief Justice assigned him only uncontroversial cases,
or safe ones where errors would have less consequence. While the Court was
sharply divided, McReynolds was entrusted only with unanimous opinions. The
subject matter was often rather banal – an admiralty suit over spoiled fish meal,221
whether the dormant Commerce Clause applied to interstate shipment of a dead
horse,222 whether the conditional seller of a forfeited automobile met the statutory
standard for an innocent interest-owner.223 The remainder largely involved issues
with obvious answers: a gift from an 80 year old male with health problems was a
transfer in contemplation of death,224 a creditor cannot execute upon a disabled
veteran’s pension,225 two states cannot impose full inheritance taxes on the same
trust,226 a search incident to arrest can occur on private property.227

217

MASON, supra note 214, at 215-16.

218

BOND, supra note 215, at 58. The reference is to Hopkins v. Hebard, 235 U.S. 287
(1914).
219
Volume 305, U.S., has 556 pages of signed opinions, Volume 306, U.S., has 614 pages,
and Volume 307 U.S., has 608 pages.
220

McReynolds authored two and three page opinions in Fairbanks v. United States, 306
U.S. 436 (1939) and United States v. Durkee Famous Foods, 306 U.S. 68 (1939). He wrote
four four page opinions, Carrier v. Bryant, 306 U.S. 545 (1939); Colorado Nat’l Bank of
Denver v. Comm’r., 305 U.S. 23 (1938); Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Virginia, 305
U.S. 19 (1938); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938). He authored a pair of five
pagers, Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939); Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306
U.S. 62 (1939); three six pagers, United States v. Bertelsen & Petersen Eng’g, 306 U.S. 276
(1939); United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939); Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous
Coal Comm’n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939); and one spanning seven pages, Smith v. Ferncliff, 306
U.S. 444 (1939). Miller was one of only three McReynolds opinions that made it into the
double-digit range: United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (10 pages); Washingtonian
Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939) (12 pages); United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V8 De Luxe Coach, Motor No. 18-3306511, 307 U.S. 219 (1939) (19 pages).
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McReynolds was, in short, an intellectually lazy man on a rather brilliant court.
The Chief Justice, who as noted above had little respect for his reliability, probably
gave him Miller because it seemed safe: a potential 9-0, where only one side had
briefed, and the issue was whether a bank robber could challenge a tax on sawed-off
shotguns.
The result was an opinion outstanding for its lack of clarity — which explains
why in Heller, it could be cited as support for the majority, which held for a right to
arms for individual purposes, in Justice Stevens’ dissent, which repudiated such a
right, and in Justice Souter’s dissent, which accepted such a right arguendo, but
maintained a handgun ban was reasonable regulation.228
The one halfway clear part of McReynold’s opinion came at the beginning:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a
“shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length” at this
time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of
a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is
not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary
military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common
defense.229
By this standard, Miller was as much a ruling on the law of evidence as it was on
the Constitution. Even here it is murky. The first sentence argues that possession of
an arm is protected if that has a “reasonable relationship” (a rather loose standard) to
the efficiency of the militia. The second sentence refers to protection of “ordinary
military equipment” and cites Aymette, which suggested that military arms were
protected by the right to arms, and Bowie knives were not. This would suggest (but
not clearly rule) that the “reasonable relationship” is met if civilian practice with an
arm would develop militarily-useful skills. The first sentence might be read to
support a right related (in some unspecified way) to militia service; the second
sentence supports a more individualistic right to possession and practice with
military-type arms. No wonder that both the Heller majority and its dissents could
find comfort in Miller!
The opinion went downhill from there. McReynolds follows with a reference to
Congressional power over the militia and the note that “[w]ith obvious purpose to
assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces the
declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be
interpreted and applied with that end in view.”230 The opinion does not explain the
latter point: Is the militia concept a limit to the right, or merely counsel upon its
meaning?
Next, McReynolds turned to the question of what is the militia, citing Framing
period sources which

228
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 618-25 (2008); id. at 637-41 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); id. at 684-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
229

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (citing Aymette v. Tennessee, 2
Humph., Tenn. 154, 158.
230

Id.
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show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically
capable of acting in concert for the common defense. “A body of citizens
enrolled for military discipline.” And further, that ordinarily when called
for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by
themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.231
Here we have three different concepts, listed without analysis. Is the militia all
physically suitable males, or only those enrolled in an organization? What is the
significance of the fact that they were expected to produce arms “of the kind in
common use?” Is this merely a historical note — militiamen were expected to bring
what they had, not cannons and mortars or medieval catapults — or a limitation of
the scope of the right? If a limitation, does “in common use” relate to then, or now?
In common use by civilians, or by the military?232 Miller gave no clue.
Finally, rather than analyzing available case law and commentators, McReynolds
simply noted “[i]n the margin, some of the more important opinions and comments
by writers are cited.”233 Among the sources cited were Blaksley, which held that the
right to arms was limited to militia service; both Aymette and Fife, which held that it
was not; Joseph Story, who discussed the Amendment in terms of the militia; and
Thomas Cooley, who vigorously denied that its protections were limited to militia
service. None were given a word of analysis or reconciliation.
Miller, in short, probably began as a collusive case, set up to be an easy win for
the government. This plan backfired, due to a rambling, one-sided briefing, and
assignment of the “easy cases” to the lazy Justice McReynolds. As a result, in the
lower courts Miller became not so much guidance as an obstacle to be circumvented
and later mere background material to be invoked in passing.
C. 1939 – 2008: Miller in the Lower Courts
1. Early Decisions: Cases and Tot
The first two Circuits to deal with Miller did so in the context of the Federal
Firearm Act’s prohibition on interstate receipt of firearms by those convicted of
violent felonies. While it would seem this restriction would easily pass muster as a
reasonable restriction of any right to arms, the courts spent considerable time
grappling with Miller’s murky reasoning.
In Cases v. United States,234 the First Circuit concluded that, under Miller, the
government “cannot prohibit the possession or use of any weapon which has any
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia.”235 “However,” it added, “we do not feel that the Supreme Court in this case
231

Id. at 179.

232

The divergence between civilian and military firearms is a product of the latter half of
the 20th century; before then, both civilians and military used bolt-action rifles, and surplus
military rifles were sold at surplus to converted for civilian use. The author has a book
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stock and installing improved civilian sights. With handguns, even today the military issue –
9mm and .45 semiautomatics -- are identical to civilian ones.
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was attempting to formulate a general rule applicable to all cases.”236 The First
Circuit did not distinguish Miller so much as refuse to follow it:
At any rate the rule of the Miller case, if intended to be comprehensive
and complete would seem to be already outdated, in spite of the fact that it
was formulated only three and a half years ago, because of the well
known fact that in the so called ‘Commando Units’ some sort of military
use seems to have been found for almost any modern lethal weapon.237
It then announced, with no citation to authority, a militia-use-only rule, or a least a
strict version of a militia-related requirement. It noted that the defendant had taken
the pistol to a night club and shot another patron and
[w]hile the weapon may be capable of military use, or while at least
familiarity with it might be regarded as of value in training a person to use
a comparable weapon of military type and caliber, still there is no
evidence that the appellant was or ever had been a member of any military
organization or that his use of the weapon under the circumstances
disclosed was in preparation for a military career. In fact, the only
inference possible is that the appellant at the time charged in the
indictment was in possession of, transporting, and using the firearm and
ammunition purely and simply on a frolic of his own and without any
thought or intention of contributing to the efficiency of the well regulated
militia which the Second Amendment was designed to foster as necessary
to the security of a free state.238
As Professor Denning has noted,
Far from reading it as rendering no protection to an individual's right to
keep and bear arms, the Cases court assumed, by carrying Justice
McReynold’s reasoning to its logical conclusion, that the Miller opinion,
if intended as a general rule, afforded entirely too much protection to a
wide range of potentially destructive devices that individuals might seek
to possess. The Second Circuit thus rejected the Miller decision out of
hand and proceeded, inexplicably, to engraft a state of mind requirement
onto the Second Amendment where one had not previously existed . . . .
The Cases decision serves as a good example of a case decided according
to what Karl Llewellyn would call the judges’ “sense of the situation.”
The court assumed that, as a matter of public policy, any meaningful
limitation upon the government’s ability to restrict private ownership of
arms is bad; and the court decided the case accordingly, assuming that the
framers of the Second Amendment did not intend it to present an
impediment to the government in this regard.239
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In United States v. Tot,240 the Third Circuit at least tried to follow Miller,
suggesting that the defendant, a convicted violent felon, had failed to show that his
possession of a pistol was linked to the preservation of a well-regulated militia, but
concluded
the same result is definitely indicated on a broader ground and on this we
should prefer to rest the matter. Weapon bearing was never treated as
anything like an absolute right by the common law . . . . One could hardly
argue seriously that a limitation upon the privilege of possessing weapons
was unconstitutional when applied to a mental patient of the maniac type.
The same would be true if the possessor were a child of immature years.
In the situation at bar Congress has prohibited the receipt of weapons
from interstate transactions by persons who have previously, by due
process of law, been shown to be aggressors against society. Such a
classification is entirely reasonable and does not infringe upon the
preservation of the well regulated militia protected by the Second
Amendment.241
Cases cited no authority for its interpretation of the Second Amendment, and
expressly acknowledged it was trying to circumvent, rather than follow, United
States v. Miller.242 Tot ultimately centered upon reasonable regulation of the right
involved, a position quite defensible in the context of a convicted violent felon.
At that, the two rulings lay largely quiescent, as did the firearm issue itself, for
the next thirty years.
2. 1970-2000: The Spread of “Collective Rights” in the Lower Federal Courts
Cases and Tot did set the stage for the next development, as the gun control
policy issue came to the forefront in the late 1960s and the following decade. The
lower federal courts widely employed variants of a collective rights view to rebuff
challenges to firearms restrictions. “Unfortunately, many of these contemporary
courts seized on Cases’ bizarre state of mind requirement and Tot’s unsupported
‘collective theory’ interpretation as a convenient way to dispose of bothersome
Second Amendment claims. Further, many courts began to cite Miller as actually
standing for the holdings in Cases and Tot.”243
One approach involved paraphrasing the Miller references to arms suitable for
militia use into “militia arms,” and then treating “militia arms” as being arms
actually in use for militia duties. By the 1980s, courts taking this approach were apt
simply to invoke Miller as establishing “that the right to keep and bear arms extends
only to those arms which are necessary to maintain a well regulated militia” and thus
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United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463
(1943).
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Cases’ announcement that a recent Supreme Court ruling was “outdated” is surely an
unusual event!
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that “[u]nder the controlling authority of Miller we conclude that the right to keep
and bear handguns is not guaranteed by the second amendment.”244
A second approach was the purest form of “collective right.” In the words of the
Sixth Circuit, “[s]ince the Second Amendment right ‘to keep and bear Arms’ applies
only to the right of the State to maintain a militia and not to the individual’s right to
bear arms, there can be no serious claim to any express constitutional right of an
individual to possess a firearm.”245
A third approach involved taking the second position to its logical extreme, and
holding that individuals lacked even standing to raise a Second Amendment
challenge, since the right involved was that of a State. 246
The first of these variants at least involved an attempt to follow Miller’s
ambiguous reasoning; the second, and still more so the third, reached conclusions
difficult to reconcile with that decision. The lower courts following the three
variants made no attempt to examine the historical record; their view of history
began in 1939, or perhaps 1942. To be fair, at the beginning of this period, there had
been little documentation of the relevant history. That was about to change.
3. 1975-2010: The Downfall of Collective Right Theories
The collective right approach had been hastily constructed; it was about to be
subjected to a detailed criticism, which came in three waves.
The first wave consisted of researchers who, over several decades, uncovered and
documented the seemingly-lost history of the right to arms.247 These discoveries, or
rediscoveries, need not be detailed here, since they represent the content of the first
portion of this article.
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The second wave was begun by Don Kates’ 1983 article in Michigan Law
Review,248 which exposed their findings to a larger audience. Over the following
decade, the individual right view of the Second Amendment secured the
endorsement of established constitutional scholars, including Sanford Levinson,249
William van Alstyne,250 Akhil Amar,251 Leonard Levy,252 Larry Tribe,253 as well as
rising stars such as Randy Barnett,254 Glenn Harlan Reynolds,255 Robert Cottrol,256
and Eugene Volokh.257 In 1983, Joyce Lee Malcolm would aptly describe the thencurrent understanding of the Second Amendment as “historical amnesia.”258 A
dozen years later, Glenn Harlan Reynolds would describe the individual rights view
as the “Standard Model” of the Amendment.259
That left defenders of militia-use-only theories with one last refuge: the federal
case law that had arisen during the period of historical amnesia. For example: “An
extraordinarily consistent body of case law has held that a variety of restrictions on
private firearms ownership, use, and sales do not violate the Second Amendment,
because such restrictions have no effect on the maintenance of a well-regulated
militia—the National Guard.”260 The third and final wave of Second Amendment
renaissance came as the individual rights view secured acceptance in the courts.
This stage began with United States v. Emerson,261 where the Fifth Circuit
recognized an individual right to arms, and culminated in the Supreme Court’s
rulings in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago.
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V. CONCLUSION
From the viewpoint of a court in 2001, it might seem that the meaning of the
Second Amendment was well settled; it related only to service in an organized State
militia. In reality, that view had dominated the federal courts only for about three
decades, and had been subject to serious criticism even during this brief lifespan.
The period of the Framing had seen the evolution of two competing ideas for
bills of rights – a recognition of the militia system, and a guarantee of an individual
right to arms. The two were not merged until the Virginia Ratifying Convention of
1788. Thereafter, of the two, the individual right to arms was seen as dominant, as
documented by Madison’s writings, his original organization of the Bill of Rights,
and the actions of the First Senate in rejecting both a right to arms “for the common
defense” and amendments which would have expressly protected State power over
the militia.
These understandings were confirmed by the early constitutional commentators,
and by early American courts. The militia-uses-only view was represented by one
minor exception in each case.
By the time of the Civil War, the individual right view was accepted by
abolitionists and by Justice Taney, by Republican and Democratic national platforms
alike; in postwar years the Reconstruction Congresses, the courts, and the major
legal commentators took the same approach, as did (with a single exception) early
20th century courts.
To a casual observer in the early 21st century it might seem that the militiauses—only view of the Second Amendment had always been predominant, and the
Heller and McDonald involved dramatic legal change. In full historical context,
however, it becomes apparent that those decisions recognize the individual rights
understanding that had prevailed from the Framing onward. The militia-uses-only
approach rejected in Heller and McDonald was in fact a very recent creation of the
lower federal courts, utterly ahistoric, and which had been subject to scholarly
challenge almost from its outset.
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